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Court, and someone who was successful in achieving it. What 
Schwartz ends up describing, however, is a weak, ineffectual Chief 
Justice, unable to give effect to his own ideological views and, for 
the most part, unable to ride herd on his Court. As a result, the 
sharp turn to the right from Warren Era liberalism, which both 
President Nixon and Burger himself envisioned, never materialized. 
In many areas the Burger Court kept Warren policies alive through 
sheer inertia, while in others the Court actually moved further to 
the left. The turns to the right were haphazard, unpredictable, and 
reflected no consistent ideology. This was not an ascent of pragma-
tism; it was a collapse of leadership. "I don't think that the Burger 
Court has as wide a sense of mission," Schwartz quotes then Asso-
ciate Justice Rehnquist as saying, in comparing the Burger and 
Warren Courts. "Perhaps it doesn't have any sense of mission at 
all." Schwartz concludes that Roe v. Wade was the "paradigmatic" 
Burger Court decision-because it reveals a thrashing group, with 
even those in agreement as to outcome unable to form a consensus 
on the reasoning. 
CONSTITUTION MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSEN-
SUS IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. By 
Calvin C. Jillson.1 New York: Agathon Press. 1988. Pp. xiv, 
242. Hardcover, $30.00; Paperback, $15.00. 
Richard S. Kay 2 
In this book Professor Calvin Jillson, a political scientist, has 
sought to cast new light on the much-studied process of decision-
making at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. It is an interesting 
attempt to apply modem techniques of quantitative social science 
·research to the archival evidence of the Convention's proceedings. 
While this is an admirable and promising enterprise, in the end the 
illumination shed by the data examined proves disappointingly 
limited. 
In one sense, Professor Jillson is attempting to complicate what 
he takes to be oversimplified explanations in the existing literature. 
He reads previous analysts as falling into two categories, each con-
centrating on a limited and partial approach to the Convention. 
One group (Charles Beard and Forrest McDonald are exemplary) 
L Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, 
Boulder. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. 
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saw the differences in Philadelphia largely as a clash of material-
social and economic-interests. Another, somewhat later, group 
(here Louis Hartz and Bernard Bailyn are typical) were more im-
pressed with the convention's divisions on ideological and theoreti-
cal lines. Jillson, on the other hand, posits an understanding of the 
deliberations in which both interest- and principle-based differences 
were important. 
In a second sense, however, Professor Jillson seeks to simplify 
and organize our views of the convention. "[T]he activities of the 
Convention," he tells us, "were by no means as fluid and unstruc-
tured as past interpretations have indicated." Conflicts based on 
principle and those based on interests more or less took turns in 
controlling the course of decision. 
More specifically, Jillson divides the four and one-half months 
of the convention into five discrete periods. In two of these periods 
the issues were dominated by "higher level questions." These ques-
tions were concerned in a general way with "the scope, scale and 
form appropriate to government." In deciding such issues, Jillson 
claims, the state delegations divided into two coalitions reflecting 
the political subcultures of different regions of the country. There 
was first what he calls a "peripheral coalition" of the states of New 
England and the South. In each of these regions either "moralistic" 
or "libertarian" republican attitudes resulted in a preference for 
limited and localized governmental power. Against this alliance, he 
finds, ranged a second coalition of Middle Atlantic states where 
"nationalist" republicanism manifested itself in a preference for 
stronger and more dynamic government. 
In the remaining three periods, on the other hand, Professor 
Jillson asserts that these alignments, premised on large principles of 
government, gave way to voting patterns reflecting more concrete 
interests. The groupings of states described were somewhat differ-
ent in each period and depended on the questions under discussion. 
To begin with, there is some doubt whether Jillson is correct in 
maintaining that prior treatments have consistently emphasized ide-
ology at the expense of interest or vice versa. Christopher and 
James Collier, in their enlightening and highly readable recent ac-
count of the Convention, explicitly acknowledge the importance of 
both kinds of influence.3 And Forrest McDonald, whose earlier 
work is cited by Jillson as an example of the interest-based, eco-
nomic interpretation of the convention, felt it necessary to complete 
his analysis with a volume focusing on the "intellectual 
3. Christopher Collier and James Lincoln Collier, Decision in Philadelphia: The Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 xi-xii (Random House, 1986) ("Decision in Philadelphia"). 
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dimension."4 
It is apparent, in any event, that the sharp distinction drawn 
between these two classes of issues is, at best, problematic. Jillson 
defines "higher level" issues as those relating to "regime type and 
... the basic options for institutional design." The "lower level" 
issues are those concerning the "rules that will regulate and order 
behavior within the regime's primary institutions." The former 
questions were decided based on broad political philosophies-
largely because the participants were less able to forecast on which 
side of the controversy their more immediate interests lay. 
Such a distinction makes intuitive sense but appears to break 
down as soon as an attempt is made to relate it to the particular 
questions at issue in the convention. Thus we can understand that 
the apportionment of representatives in the national legislature 
might be thought directly to engage material interests. Therefore, it 
would likely have been fought out on the "lower level." But then 
why wasn't the method of selection of the executive, which Jillson 
finds was contested on the "higher level," the same kind of issue? 
A dramatic example of the problems of classification is the is-
sue of slavery. Jillson places it on the "lower level."s Certainly the 
character of any national regulation of slavery and the slave trade 
had profound economic consequences for certain states and was, 
moreover, closely related to questions of representation and there-
fore of relative political power. But it does not take too much re-
flection to realize that its resolution was fundamentally related to 
larger questions of the kind of polity the delegates were framing. It 
could not but be influenced by convictions of deep principle. There 
is ample evidence that many delegates were conscious of that 
dimension. 6 
The centerpiece of Professor Jillson's picture of the convention 
is a statistical analysis of the 569 roll call votes. The technique em-
ployed is known as "factor analysis." Unfortunately for the uniniti-
ated, Jillson provides almost nothing in the way of explaining the 
rationale or methodology of this device. The statistically innocent 
reader is confronted with table after terrifying table of rows and 
4. Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo Sec/orum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitu-
tion viii-ix (U. Press Kansas, 1985) ("Novus Ordo Seclorum"). 
5. At a different point, however, Jillson speaks of the slavery controversy as illustrative 
of a "more general conflict between an expansive Americanism and a restricted regionalism." 
This formulation is more consistent with the definition of "higher level" issues. 
6. See e.g., McDonald, Novus Ordo Sec/orum at 50-55 (cited in note 4). But see Max 
Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States 110 (Yale U. Press, 1913) 
("Framing") ("[S]Iavery was not the important question, it might be said it was not the moral 
question, that it later became. . . . As a matter of fact, there was comparatively little said on 
the subject in the convention.") 
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columns of numbers with such daunting headings as "Large States 
versus Small States: Power and Interest: Five Factor Solution to 
Roll-Call Votes 37-156, June 11 - July 17, Varimax Rotation 
(Ortho)." 
Factor analysis is, I have learned elsewhere, 1 a way of trying to 
make sense of a great mass of data. Correlations of individual ele-
ments are discovered and those correlations are further examined to 
see whether they can be accounted for by some smaller number of 
common factors. In Jillson's analysis of the roll call votes at the 
convention, for example, correlations of votes between pairs of indi-
vidual states are examined to determine whether these individual 
associations cluster together in a way that indicates the presence of 
some common explanatory factors. It is in this way that Jillson has 
teased out of the data stable patterns of voting by coalition over 
particular periods, as well as the moments when these coalitions 
dissolved and formed again. The work done to execute this project 
is impressive. At least as far as I am able to judge, the methods 
employed seem sensible and the results statistically significant. 
In addition to this statistical demonstration, Jillson provides a 
textual discussion of the formation and shifts in the coalitions he 
has discovered. Going over the same periods which have emerged 
from the factor analysis, he examines these coalitions in action, not-
ing the issues that dominated debate in each period and the underly-
ing reasons that might explain the particular alignments associated 
with them. It is in this connection that he posits the distinction 
between higher and lower level issues mentioned. 
There are obvious limits to the understanding which can be 
taken from an analysis that focuses on the divisions at the conven-
tion. That is because, to a very remarkable degree, certain critical 
convictions were held almost universally. For example, Professor 
Jillson observes that by May 30 the distinct nationalist and localist 
perspectives on the shape of the new government had already devel-
oped. But, in fact, on May 31 the Convention approved a resolu-
tion giving the national legislature the power to legislate "in all 
cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompe-
tent" by a vote of 9-0-1. Nor did the division of opinion he observes 
appear on July 17 when Roger Sherman's motion to confine this 
power so as not to extend to "any matters of internal police which 
respect the government of such states only" was defeated by a vote 
7. See Frederick Williams, Reasoning with Statistics: How to Read QuantitatiW! Re-
search 165-83 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 3d ed. 1986). Noreen Channels of the Sociology 
Department of Trinity College was kind enough to explain it to me. She should not be 
blamed for my, no doubt, imperfect understanding. 
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of 8-2.s 
Even when the convention was plainly of more than one mind, 
the structure emerging from the factor analysis is often discernible 
only with great difficulty in the heuristic description that accompa-
nies it. Jillson quite properly focuses his textual discussion on the 
significant votes on the central issues confronting the convention. 
When he does this, however, the arrangement of votes often does 
not fall obviously into the pattern to be expected from the statistical 
study. Indeed, on occasion one gets the sense that the delegations' 
positions on related votes on the same issue were almost random. 
An example is a series of votes taken on July 17 and 19 on the 
term and selection of the executive. According to Jillson, this pe-
riod and this question were dominated by "higher level" considera-
tions and, therefore, the votes can be best explained in light of the 
two voting coalitions mentioned. The first, "peripheral," coalition 
consisted, at that moment, of four states: Massachusetts, North 
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. It favored a "dependent ex-
ecutive package" based on selection by the national legislature, a 
relatively long term and ineligibility for reelection. The opposing 
"Middle Atlantic" coalition consisted of six states: Connecticut, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia.9 
This coalition favored an "independent executive package" based 
on election by popular vote or an electoral college, a relatively short 
term and the possibility of reelection. 
Now consider the actual voting on the eleven roll call votes on 
questions involving these issues on these two days. It is unnecessary 
to recount the actual issues involved in each vote. They all concern 
the interrelated issues of term, selection and reelectabilityJO and we 
should therefore expect to see the two coalitions listed above. The 
lists below group the delegations by how they voted (aye, no, di-
vided) on each roll call: 
8. Max Farrand, ed., 2 Records of the Federal Convention 25-26 (Yale U. Press, 1911) 
("Records"). 
9. Neither New Hampshire nor New York had delegations present on these days. 
10. These votes are taken from Farrand, 2 Records, as Jillson does not give a complete 
breakdown of each vote. Votes 1-6 were taken on July 17, and are found in id. at 24. Votes 
7-11 were taken on July 19 and are found in id. at 51. The subject matter of each vote was as 
follows. I. To choose executive by popular election. 2. To choose executive by electors. 3. 
To choose executive by national legislature. 4. To strike ineligibility for second term. 5. To 
substitute "good behavior" for seven year term. 6. To strike seven year term. 7. To choose 
executive by electors. 8. To choose electors by state legislatures. 9. To make executive ineli-
gible for second term. 10. To set seven year term. (In Madison's notes, Connecticut is shown 
voting aye and New Jersey no. ld. at 58.) II. To set six year term. 
520 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:515 
1. Penn. Mass. 
Conn. 
N.J. 
Del. 
Md. 
Va. 
N.C. 
S.C. 
Ga. 
4. Mass. Del. 
Conn. Va. 
N.J. N.C. 
Penn. S.C. 
Md. 
Ga. 
7. Conn. N.C. 
N.J. S.C. 
Penn. Ga. 
Del. 
Md. 
Va. 
2. Del. Mass. 
Md. Conn. 
N.J. 
Penn. 
Va. 
N.C. 
S.C. 
Ga. 
5. N.J. Mass. 
Penn. Conn. 
Del. Md. 
Va. N.C. 
S.C. 
Ga. 
Mass. 8. Mass. Va. 
Conn. S.C. 
N.J. 
Penn. 
Del. 
Md. 
N.C. 
Ga. 
10. N.J. 
S.C. 
Ga. 
Conn. Mass. 
Penn. N.C. 
Del. 
11. Mass. 
Conn. 
N.J. 
Penn. 
Md. 
Va. 
N.C. 
S.C. 
Md. 
Va. 
Ga. 
3. Mass. 
Conn. 
N.J. 
Penn. 
Del. 
Md. 
Va. 
N.C. 
S.C. 
Ga. 
6. Mass. 
Penn. 
Del. 
N.C. 
9. N.C. 
S.C. 
Del. 
Conn. 
N.J. 
Md. 
Va. 
S.C. 
Ga. 
Mass. 
Conn. 
N.J. 
Penn. 
Del. 
Md. 
Va. 
Ga. 
It is difficult to see bow these votes exemplify a stable pattern of 
coalition voting. While this example may be extreme, it illustrates a 
common and unsatisfying lack of fit between the general thesis, 
founded on the statistical study, and the textual explanation of par-
ticular debates and votes. Necessarily it makes the reader skeptical 
of the former. 
A critical difficulty may be the assumption-at the heart of this 
analysis-that the proceedings of the Convention can be best under-
stood as the decisions of state delegations. The almost anthropo-
morphic emphasis on states ("During the first week of September 
... Connecticut, New Jersey, and Maryland struggled to maintain 
1991] BOOK REVIEWS 521 
the integrity of the states in the new system.") casts an air of unreal-
ity on the description. 
It is true that votes were taken by states. Indeed, the Conven-
tion rejected a rule allowing the recording of individual votes. 11 
Consequently, state votes provide the only available data for this 
kind of study. Moreover, the delegates certainly consulted the in-
terests of their states when casting their votes. But an exclusive 
focus on the states as the critical units obscures the role of the indi-
vidual delegates, the real actors in the drafting process. This is 
made obvious by the numerous instances in which a state delegation 
was unable to vote because its members were divided. What could 
it mean, for example, to refer to the position of "New York" at the 
convention? Two of its three delegates, Robert Yates and John 
Lansing, opposed the creation of a strong national government and 
(until they left the Convention in mid-July, leaving the state with no 
vote) controlled the votes of the delegation over the opposition of 
their colleague, Alexander Hamilton.12 Hamilton's impact on the 
convention has never been thought to be substantial,13 but Jillson's 
analysis leaves him out altogether. Similarly, the differences be-
tween George Mason and James Madison on such matters as ana-
tional veto of state legislation or a bill of rights are submerged in the 
actions of a single vote of Virginia.l4 
In the end, Constitution Making contains a great deal of useful 
information and more than a few interesting insights. It is hard to 
resist the conclusion, however, that its depiction of the convention 
is too much the captive of the numbers that form its foundation. As 
such it is more valuable for its description than its explanation. 
II. Farrand, I Records at 10. 
12. See Farrand, Framing at 29, 73, 81, 105 (cited in note 6); Collier and Collier, Deci-
sion in Philadelphia at 56-57 (cited in note 3). 
13. See Collier and Collier, Decision in Philadelphia at 56 (cited in note 3). 
14. See id. at 197-98, 254. 
